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Recognition of business and economic
interests of media in defamation and
privacy law
Ursula Cheer*
‘We value the freedom of the press but the press is a commercial enterprise
and can flourish only by selling newspapers’†
This article explores, with particular reference to the law in the United Kingdom and
New Zealand, features of the dignity torts, defamation and privacy, which have the
potential to recognise and thereby protect the business and economic interests of
media. It traverses the development of public interest defences in both torts and
examines how the courts carry out the balancing process involved in determining the
validity of pleaded public interest defences. In privacy claims, the determination of
whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy impacts greatly on how
media may go about the business of newsgathering and publishing. The developing
remedial principles in privacy law are also discussed. Finally in defamation, the
developing threshold requirement for a plaintiff to show some form of serious harm
from published speech is analysed to determine whether it reduces the outlay for media
conglomerates from the risk-fraught but central enterprise of publication. Although
there appears to be no overt principle governing when business and economic interests
are protected within defamation and privacy law, nonetheless, elements of recognition
of the need for protection can be detected within these torts.
I Introduction
Currently a powerful commercial imperative to maintain effective profi
models exists for media businesses in a context of ongoing massive disruption
to media markets, caused by new technologies allowing the flo of
information across multiple media platforms. This has prompted migration of
audiences and advertising away from mainstream media, resulting in
increasing reductions in profit This ‘problem’ is generally referred to as the
phenomenon of convergence. Media businesses are in transition and seeking
new profi models. In this context, laws which affect the business and
economic interests of media have profound impact.
This article explores features of the dignity torts, defamation and privacy,
which have potential to protect the business and economic interests of media
and media companies. In order to do this, it focusses on what is often referred
to as ‘the commercial imperative’ — or the drive to make a profit as the
particular business and economic interest involved. The commercial
imperative operates powerfully on the media to obtain and publish
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information which will sell to the widest possible audience. By ‘media’ is
meant mainstream media (sometimes also called ‘old’ or ‘legacy’ media),
referring to traditional forms of mass communication, such as newspapers,
television, and radio (together with their various internet manifestations)
regarded collectively.1
In common law jurisdictions, the ancient tort of defamation has, for
centuries, provided some protection for reputation for determined plaintiffs,
while remaining a constant irritation for media because claims to prevent
publication or seek compensation for publication obviously increase business
risk for media businesses. Much more recently, partly in response, it has been
suggested, to convergence, the burgeoning judge-made torts of privacy have
made their appearance, thus increasing the extent of media business risk.
Common law jurisdictions, and particularly those with legislative or
constitutional protection of human or civil rights, now variously recognise a
tort which remedies breach of privacy caused by publication of private
information, and sometimes also, something akin to a tort of intrusion into
seclusion.2
The possibility of a claim associated with publication or newsgathering is
undoubtedly a risk that has attached to being in the media business for a very
long time, a risk that is recognised by the existence of various specialised
forms of insurance. A realised risk brings cost, and the cost of defending a
claim made under what are seen as restrictive plaintiff-friendly laws is the
most obvious of these, followed by damages and the costs of the plaintiff’s
legal team if the defence is unsuccessful. However, there may be additional
costs arising from the general chilling effects said to result from a successful
claim, whereby certain stories are lost or cease to be published or pursued, at
least for a time, or risk-averse procedures dominate, at least for a while. Of
course, from a plaintiff and plaintiff-lawyer perspective, these costs are
regarded as entirely appropriate and desirable. However, for media they are
real and to be resisted, and often fall harder on smaller businesses. Therefore
any development or application of the law which appears to reduce this
business risk is welcomed by media.
Both the defamation and privacy torts are about protection from harms
arising from published speech or a desire to publish speech. The law of
defamation protects the respect and esteem in which a person is held because
that is the essence of reputation. New Zealand, for example, applies
established English case law definition such as: ‘a statement that might tend
to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society
generally’;3 and ‘a false statement about a man to his discredit’.4 Although
somewhat old-fashioned, these definition speak strongly to loss of dignity
and autonomy, with an emphasis on the falsity of the information.
In privacy, it has been recognised from the outset that the action is also
1 Oxford Dictionaries, Oxford University Press, at <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/>
(accessed 14 November 2016).
2 See, eg, Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2016] 2 All ER 337; [2015] 3 WLR 409; [2015] EWCA
Civ 311; Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1; [2004] BCL 395; BC200460235 (Hosking);
C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672; [2012] NZHC 2155.
3 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240 per Lord Atkin.
4 Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581 at 584 per Scrutton LJ.
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about protecting dignity and autonomy — in Campbell v MGN Ltd5 Lord
Hope stated that the new form of privacy protection the House of Lords
recognised in that case was about: ‘the protection of human autonomy and
dignity — the right to control the dissemination of information about one’s
private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people’.6 In
Hosking v Runting, the leading NZ case, Tipping J in the majority said:
It is of the essence of the dignity and personal autonomy and wellbeing of all human
beings that some aspects of their lives should be able to remain private if they so
wish.7
In both defamation and privacy actions, then, plaintiffs assert autonomy over
the use (and sometimes the collection) of information about them, either true
or false. This assertion clashes directly with the business and economic
interest of media — the commercial imperative — described above. Therefore
any features of the torts which allow the balancing, reduction or defeat of
assertions of plaintiff informational autonomy are of great value to media.
These may be direct benefit but are more likely to be indirect.
In this article I attempt to examine selected features of the torts which
appear to have this potential. The article therefore traverses the development
of public interest defences in both torts and in particular, how public interest
has been define and applied in ways that can take account of the commercial
imperative. The general question asked is to what extent judicial interpretation
of what it is media corporates should validly make a profi out of features in
the treatment of the public interest defences.
I go on to examine the tort of privacy, where the determination of what a
reasonable expectation of privacy is in each case impacts greatly on how
media may go about the business of newsgathering and publishing. I also
investigate developing remedial principles in privacy law to determine how
chilling these laws will be on media businesses.
Finally, in defamation, I examine a developing threshold requirement for a
plaintiff to show some form of serious harm from published speech when
making a claim. Requirements which make it harder for plaintiffs to sue can
obviously mitigate damage to the business and economic interests of media.
I conclude that although there appears to be no overt principle governing
when business and economic interests are protected within defamation and
privacy law, nonetheless, elements of recognition of the need for protection
can be detected within these torts, and other elements provide useful
protections by a side wind.
5 [2004] 2 AC 457; 62 IPR 231; [2004] 2 All ER 995; [2004] UKHL 22 at [51]. See also U
Cheer, ‘Divining the Dignity Torts — A Possible Future for Defamation and Privacy’ in
Comparative Defamation and Privacy, A T Kenyon (Ed), Cambridge University Press,
2016, p 318.
6 As identifie and endorsed by N Moreham in ‘The Protection of Privacy in English
Common Law: A doctrinal and theoretical analysis’ (2005) LQR 121 at 628–56. See also the
theorists noted by Moreham in her n 34.
7 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1; [2004] BCL 395; BC200460235 at [239]. See also McGrath J in
Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91; [2007] NZSC 30; BC200760845 at [225].
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II Public interest defences in defamation and privacy
Public interest defences have great value to media in terms of being able to
perform their prime functions and manage business risk. It is interesting to
note that this defence attached to the older tort of defamation only quite
recently, but the privacy torts came with the defence attached from their
inception. The problem of definin and delimiting the defence is common to
both torts, however. Further, defamation public interest defences are qualifie
by conditions of responsibility as to the truth which, if imposed with a heavy
hand, could detract from the obvious value of these defences.8
A public interest defence allows a defendant to argue that publication of the
impugned material should be allowed because the public has a ‘right to know’
the information, or a genuine interest of some kind in it. Considerable judicial
and other ink has been spilled trying to defin what the public interest means.9
One favoured formulation is based on the idea that the information is of
‘legitimate public concern’.10 This approach is an attempt to emphasise that
public interest topics are not simply those that the public is interested in. The
word ‘concern’ suggests the information must be of importance to the public,
rather than one which they simply have a ‘low’ curiosity to read.11 The latter
interpretation would allow the media almost unlimited scope to protect its
business and economic interests. This approach is taken in the United States,
where in the law of privacy, the defence of public interest has been equated
with the term ‘newsworthy’ and ‘To a very great extent the press, with its
experience or instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded in
making its own definitio of news’.12 Thus a very powerful public interest
defence exists in that jurisdiction, no doubt influence in large part by the
supremacy of freedom of expression within the American constitution. While
media in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand would no doubt
prefer such an approach, it is not one that prevails and instead, a balancing
approach is favoured where many elements are weighed to determine whether
the defence is successful, including freedom of expression.
Although it adds come clarity to the issue of what is in the public interest,
the legitimate public concern approach still begs the question of what can
legitimately be published, and arguably more specifi approaches may be
helpful. A survey of recent developments in defamation law is of some
interest. New Zealand defamation law provides a form of qualifie
protection13 to statements published generally which directly concern the
functioning of representative and responsible government. In particular, this
covers statements made about the public responsibilities of past, present or
8 This is not relevant to privacy cases, which are usually based on publication of true
information.
9 See, eg, Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions, HL Paper
273/HC 1443, House of Lords and House of Commons, 27 March 2012, at [47]–[50].
10 For example, the leading NZ privacy cases, Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1; [2004] BCL 395;
BC200460235 at [267]; C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672; [2012] NZHC 2155 at [96].
11 See in particular Hosking, ibid, at [113] per Gault P and Blanchard J.
12 W P Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th ed, West Group, pp 860–2.
13 The defence is lost if there is ill will, or recklessness or a cavalier approach to the truth: s 19
Defamation Act 1992 (NZ).
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future politicians.14 This defence now appears to be developing into a full
public interest defence in New Zealand, in that our lower courts at least are
consistently suggesting that it is not confine to discussion about elected
politicians and could cover discussion of the quality of a consumer product
relevant to a large portion of the population, for example.15
The United Kingdom has enacted a statutory formulation which provides
that it is a defence to a defamation action to show that the statement
complained of was on a matter of public interest and the defendant reasonably
believed that publishing the statement was in the public interest.16 ‘Public
interest’ is not define and previous case law is relevant. The test there, it has
been said, is what it was in the public interest that the public should know, and
what the publication could properly consider that it was under a public duty
to tell the public.17
Australia has a constitution-based defence of qualifie privilege protecting
a reasonable publication of a communication about government and political
matters that is interpreted quite broadly as to subject matter,18 and Canada has
‘responsible communication on matters of public interest’,19 which is not
confine to discussion of government or political matters. There the subject
matter must invite public attention or substantially concern the public because
it affects the welfare of citizens or attracts considerable public notoriety or
controversy. Some segment of the public must have a genuine stake in
knowing about the matter. This element is not characterised narrowly.20
The clearer a definitio of public interest is, the more accessible and useful
it is to media wishing to avoid or reduce publication risks. A useful definitio
is one suggested some years ago by New Zealand’s Broadcasting Standards
Authority, a statutory body responsible for the regulation of television and
radio. In the context of a complaint about a breach of privacy, the BSA
suggested that an issue of public interest would have to be of concern to, or
have the potential to affect, a significan section of the NZ population and that
matters of public interest will include:
14 Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22; Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424; (1998) 4
HRNZ 683; Lange v Atkinson [2000] 1 NZLR 257; [2000] 2 LRC 802; (1999) 5 HRNZ 208;
Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385.
15 See U Cheer ‘The burgeoning of freedom of expression in New Zealand defamation law’ in
Media Freedom and Regulation in the New Media World, A Koltay (Ed), Wolters Kluwer,
2014, pp 273–87.
16 Defamation Act 2013 (UK) s 4(1).
17 Al-fagih v HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 48 (Nov); [2002]
EMLR 215; [2001] EWCA Civ 1634; Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273;
[2012] 4 All ER 913; [2012] 2 WLR 760; [2012] UKSC 11.
18 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1997) 189 CLR 520; 145 ALR 96; BC9702860. See
the High Court’s earlier judgments in Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182
CLR 104; 34 ALD 1; 124 ALR 1; BC9404647 and Stephens v West Australian Newspapers
Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211; 124 ALR 80; BC9404651, and Watt v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd
[1998] 3 VR 740; (1997) A Def R 52-085; BC9702673; Harkianakis v Skalkos (1999) 47
NSWLR 302; 150 FLR 330; [1999] NSWSC 505; BC9907110; O’Shane v John Fairfax
Publications Pty Ltd (2004) Aust Torts Reports 81-733; [2004] NSWSC 140;
BC200401049; cf Aktas v Westpac Banking Corporation (2010) 241 CLR 79; 268 ALR 409;
[2010] HCA 25; BC201005389 and Madafferi v Age Co Ltd [2015] VSC 687;
BC201512087.
19 Grant v Torstar Corp 2009 SCC 61; [2009] 3 SCR 640 at [7], [65].
20 Ibid, at [96]–[97].
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• criminal matters, including exposing or detecting crime;
• issues of public health or safety;
• matters of politics, government, or public administration;
• matters relating to the conduct of organisations which impact on the
public;
• exposing misleading claims made by individuals or organisations;
• exposing seriously anti-social and harmful conduct.21
The development and continued refinemen of these defences have increased
protection for the business and economic interests of media by creating more
certainty about what stories can be published. For example, my own
discussions with media and media lawyers in New Zealand have revealed that
our political discussion defamation defence is being used as a public interest
defence to resist claims and prevent them reaching court, even though there
has been no decision from our higher courts affirming the extension of the
defence as yet.
However, because most of these public interest defences allow or require
the behaviour of the publisher in obtaining and publishing the story to be
examined by the court, there is the risk that if applied in a heavy-handed way,
the value of such defences to media could be greatly reduced. In the United
Kingdom, for example, courts began to apply a series of checks developed as
guidelines to appropriate media responsibility instead as a set of mandated
threshold requirements which would give access to the public interest
defence.22 This difficulty for media was ameliorated by the Defamation Act
2013 (UK), which now requires that the court has regard to all the
circumstances of the case when determining the public interest question, and
in particular, when deciding whether it was reasonable for the defendant to
believe that publishing the statement was in the public interest, must make
such allowance for editorial judgement.23 Here we have a rare example of
explicit statutory recognition of media business and economic interests in
defamation law, effectively a direction to judges not to tell editors how to do
their job.
Media business and economic interests have also been recognised explicitly
in case law dealing with public interest defences. A good example is a NZ
privacy case called Andrews v Television New Zealand.24 The Andrews’ claim
for damages arose because they were filme by a production company for a
series commissioned by Television New Zealand (TVNZ) while being rescued
by firefighte following an accident in their vehicle. The accident occurred
when the plaintiffs were returning from a party at which they had both been
drinking. When tested later, both were found to be over the legal blood alcohol
limit. The rescue operation was a complex one because the plaintiffs were
trapped and had to be removed using ‘jaws of life’. They were unaware they
21 Balfour v Television New Zealand Ltd BSA 2005–129. See also the hierarchy of speech
suggested by Lady Hale in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457; 62 IPR 231; [2004] 2 All
ER 995; [2004] UKHL 22 at [148].
22 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127; [1999] 4 All ER 609; [1999] 3 WLR
1010; Jameel (Mohammed) v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2007] 1 AC 359; [2006] 4 All
ER 1279; [2006] 3 WLR 642; [2006] UKHL 44.
23 Defamation Act 2013 (UK) s 4(2) and (4).
24 [2009] 1 NZLR 220 (Andrews).
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were being filme and were also unaware edited footage of the incident would
be used about a year later in an episode of a reality television series ‘Fire
Fighter’, which was broadcast by TVNZ. The programme focused on the
activities of the firefighter but also showed the plaintiffs interacting with
their rescuers. Although some pixelation was used, parts of the plaintiffs’ faces
were shown, and intimate statements of endearment made by Mrs Andrews to
her husband were broadcast. Undoubtedly the work of the fir service (the
subject of the documentary) could have been shown without using the
Andrews’ conversation. However, the court recognised the realities of modern
media and accepted that audience do not engage with material unless it is
interesting. Allan J said:
In assessing an asserted defence of legitimate public concern the court will
ordinarily permit a degree of journalistic latitude so as to avoid robbing a story of
its attendant detail which adds colour and conviction.25
In another privacy case, William Young P in the Court of Appeal said:
I agree that the underlying issues can be debated without the videotape being shown
on national television but experience shows that arguments are usually more easily
understood when they are contextualised. An esoteric argument . . . becomes far
more accessible to the public if the implications can be assessed by reference to the
concrete facts of a particular case.26
In the House of Lords case Campbell v MGN Ltd Lord Nicholls expressed a
similar view. He said that non-publication of peripheral information can
sometimes rob a story ‘of colour’, and that ‘the balance ought not to be held
at a point which would preclude . . . a degree of journalistic latitude’.27
Andrews illustrates just how much judgment and balancing is involved in
assessing the defence and how this can be done in a way that is generous to
media. Although it was unnecessary to the judgment in Andrews, Allan J
stated he would have upheld a defence of legitimate public concern. This was
because he thought the reality programme had a serious underlying purpose as
well as a certain level of entertainment.28 It was about firefighte as rescue
teams and the public had an interest in the cost of road accidents and the
functioning of those teams.29 The judge indicated he would have given a
degree of latitude to the makers of the programme to allow them to report on
the work of the firefighter so he thought it did not matter that the tale could
have been told without identifying the plaintiffs.
25 Ibid, at [82].
26 Television New Zealand Ltd v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 at [128]. This dictum was
approved by Blanchard J in the Supreme Court: Television New Zealand Ltd v Rogers [2008]
2 NZLR 277; [2007] NZSC 91; BC200762862 at [55].
27 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457; 62 IPR 231; [2004] 2 All ER 995; [2004] UKHL
22 at [28], and see also at [62], [65] per Lord Hoffman, at [107]–[108] per Lord Hope, at
[169] per Lord Carswell. See also Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012]
4 All ER 913; [2012] 2 WLR 760; [2012] UKSC 11 at [132]–[137], and Re Guardian News
and Media Ltd [2010] 2 AC 697; [2010] 2 All ER 799; [2010] 2 WLR 325; [2010] UKSC
1 at [63].
28 Andrews [2009] 1 NZLR 220 at [91].
29 Ibid, at [92].
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III Reasonable expectation of privacy
In the common law jurisdictions discussed, media rely on and benefi from a
general rule that if something happens in a public place it will usually not be
categorised as private. This will self-evidently be so if the person pictured in
a public place is not the focus of the photograph, but just ‘happens to be there’.
But even where the person is the focus, the law accepts there is usually
nothing private about how a person looks in public.30 Furthermore, generally
speaking, there is no law against spying on, or taking photographs of, a
person’s property from any place outside it: from an upstairs window of
adjoining premises, through a fence, from an aeroplane, or from the
footpath.31 As far as aircraft are concerned, aviation statutes usually provide
that no action for trespass lies in respect of aircraft flyin over property at a
reasonable height.32 In an English case,33 a fir of aerial photographers took
an aerial photograph of Lord Bernstein’s country house in Kent.
Lord Bernstein took strong exception, and sued for trespass and invasion of
privacy. His claim failed. The court held that an owner has rights to the
airspace above his or her land only to such height as is necessary for the
ordinary enjoyment of that land, and that an aircraft flyin above that height
thus commits no trespass.34 Further, it was held that there was no law against
taking photographs in these circumstances. And in an Australian case, a man
30 In Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457; 62 IPR 231; [2004] 2 All ER 995; [2004] UKHL
22 at [154] Baroness Hale said:
If this had been, and had been presented as, a picture of Naomi Campbell going about
her business in a public street, there could have been no complaint. She makes a
substantial part of her living out of being photographed looking stunning in designer
clothing. Readers will obviously be interested to see how she looks if and when she pops
out to the shops for a bottle of milk. There is nothing essentially private about that
information nor can it be expected to damage her private life. It may not be a high order
of freedom of speech but there is nothing to justify interfering with it.
31 Television New Zealand Ltd v K W HC Auckland, Courtney J, CIV-2007–485–001609, 18
December 2008, unreported, at [62]–[63]. Compare Raciti v Hughes (1995) 7 BPR 97,601;
BC9501706 where Young J agreed that in the normal course of the law, photographing a
person was not actionable. However, he was prepared to accept that there were some limits
to the freedom to photograph, and, on analogy with cases dealing with telephone
harassment, was prepared to fin the use of video equipment to be sufficiently close to
watching and besetting to constitute an actionable nuisance.
32 For example, Civil Aviation Act 1990 (NZ) s 97(2). These rules are being tested by
burgeoning drone usage, which has prompted increased regulation, motived firs by safety
concerns but also to a certain extent, by privacy concerns: see, eg, D Goldberg, M Corcoran
and R G Picard, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems & Journalism: Opportunities and
Challenges of Drones in News Gathering, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism,
University of Oxford, June 2013.
33 Lord Bernstein of Leigh v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479; [1977] 2 All ER 902.
Further clear authority is found in Bathurst City Council v Saban (1985) 2 NSWLR 704,
where a photograph was taken (without trespassing) of the plaintiff’s backyard and certain
goods were stored there. It was held no wrong had been committed.
34 However, Lord Griffith did go on to say in Lord Bernstein of Leigh v Skyviews & General
Ltd, ibid, at QB 489; All ER 909: ‘But if the circumstances were such that a plaintiff was
subjected to the harassment of constant surveillance of his house from the air, accompanied
by the photographing of his every activity, I am far from saying that the court would not
regard such a monstrous invasion of his privacy as an actionable nuisance for which they
would give relief’. See also Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor
(1937) 58 CLR 479 at 493; 1A IPR 308 at 309; BC3700015 (Victoria Park).
200 (2016) 23 Torts Law Journal
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 15 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Mon Dec 12 11:27:07 2016
/journals/journal/tlj/vol23pt3/part_3
who built a high platform on premises next door to a racecourse and watched
the races and broadcast commentaries on them was held by the High Court to
have committed no wrong by so doing.35
The leading NZ publication privacy case, Hosking,36 upheld this general
rule. Mike Hosking, a television presenter, and his wife had separated. A
photographer took photographs of Mrs Hosking walking down a public street
with the Hoskings’ twin baby daughters in a pushchair. The Hoskings sued for
an injunction to stop publication of these photographs in a magazine. They
relied on invasion of privacy. Although by a majority the Court of Appeal
recognised the existence of a tort of privacy, it unanimously agreed that the
Hoskings failed on the facts. The photographs were taken in a public place;
they created no risk to the children; they disclosed no further facts about the
children, nor about the family circumstances, that were not already in the
public domain; and no reasonable person could treat publication of them as
highly offensive or objectionable.
Other NZ examples are A v Wilson & Horton Ltd37 where a police officer
who had shot a man in a public street was refused suppression of his identity.
One of his grounds for seeking it was privacy, but the court noted that what
was involved was ‘a public act in a public place by a public officer’. And more
recently in Faesenkloet v Jenkin,38 where the plaintiff objected to the
operation of a camera installed on the roof of a garage adjacent to a driveway
running to his property, the High Court held that the claim failed because there
could be no reasonable expectation of privacy given the public ownership and
use of the driveway. Media newsgathering activities would be severely
hampered if this basic legal rule did not exist. The rule is a strong example of
one which protects media business and economic interests. However, it is not
unlimited.
Tort law now recognises, though rarely, that the fact that an event takes
place in public does not always determine whether media are entitled to report
on it. This means some events occurring in a public place can still attract an
‘expectation of privacy’. Thus, an exception to the general rule described
above is when a vulnerable person is involved such that it would be repugnant
to publish. Examples recognised in various jurisdictions are where a
35 Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor, ibid. The case was applied
in Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414; 56 ALR 193;
3 IPR 545; BC8400490. However, in ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR
199; 185 ALR 1; [2001] HCA 63; BC200107043, the High Court of Australia noted that
Victoria Park would not necessarily prevent the development of a tort of privacy in that
jurisdiction: see, eg, Kirby J at [185]–[187]. No tort has yet developed, however.
36 [2005] 1 NZLR 1; [2004] BCL 395; BC200460235; noted by R Tobin, ‘Yes, Virginia, there
is a Santa Claus: the tort of invasion of privacy in New Zealand’ (2004) 12 TLJ 95; K Evans,
‘Was Privacy the Winner on the Day?’ [2004] NZLJ 181; P Sumpter and H Graham,
‘Hosking v Runting: New Zealand’s new privacy tort’ (2004) NZIPJ 290. For discussions of
Hosking and its aftermath, see J Burrows, ‘Media Law Symposium: Invasion of Privacy —
Hosking and Beyond’ [2006] NZ Law Review 389; U Cheer, ‘The Future of Privacy: Recent
Developments in New Zealand’ (2007) 13 Cant LR 169.
37 [2000] NZAR 428.
38 Faesenkloet v Jenkin [2014] NZHC 1637; BC201462813.
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photograph was taken of a person severely injured in a car accident,39 or of a
woman with the wind blowing her skirts up,40 or CCTV footage of a man who
had attempted suicide by cutting his wrists in the street.41 In the English case
of Campbell v MGN Ltd42 the plaintiff succeeded when (among other things)
she was pictured on the footpath outside a drug rehabilitation clinic. The NZ
case of Andrews43 referred to above is also an interesting illustration. In that
case it was held by Allan J that although everything had taken place in public,
the couple, who were accident victims, and therefore vulnerable, nonetheless
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their conversation.
Children are beginning to be treated as within the vulnerable exception
category, or at least as entitled to special consideration in their own right. In
New Zealand, two senior judges Gault P and Blanchard J pointed out in
Hosking that, ‘the special position of children must not be lost sight of’.44 As
Tugendhat J said in Spelman v Express Newspapers:
Children enjoy no general right to privacy simply by reason of their age. But the law
has always recognised that in particular circumstances children may be entitled to
protection from publicity where an adult would not be.45
An strong example is Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd46 which arose from
photographs taken without consent by a paparazzi photographer in LA,
California, of the musician Paul Weller and his three children out on a
mundane family occasion, shopping and having coffee. The photographs were
purchased by Associated Newspapers Ltd and published by the Mail Online,
together with an article and captions misidentifying Weller’s 16-year-old
daughter as his wife and the mother of his twin boys in the photo who were
aged 10 months. The successful claim was made by Weller on behalf of the
children, and the fact that Weller and his wife had spoken about the children
in interviews and some photos had been posted on Twitter did not prevent a
reasonable expectation from arising. Although the court recognised parents
can give away the privacy of their children, this requires more than simply
responding to questions about family life, which Weller had done in
interviews as a normal parent. Additionally, neither parent had ever allowed
39 Example given by Young J in Bathurst City Council v Saban (1985) 2 NSWLR 704 at
707–8.
40 Daily Times Democrat v Graham (1964) 162 So 2d 474. This example was also given by
Young J in Bathurst City Council v Saban, ibid.
41 Peck v United Kingdom [2003] All ER (D) 255 (Jan); [2003] EMLR 287.
42 [2004] 2 AC 457; 62 IPR 231; [2004] 2 All ER 995; [2004] UKHL 22.
43 [2009] 1 NZLR 220.
44 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1; [2004] BCL 395; BC200460235 at [123], although the Hosking
children did not receive special treatment in that case. In Television New Zealand Ltd v
Solicitor-General (2008) 28 FRNZ 108; [2008] NZFLR 706; [2008] NZCA 519 at [85]
Baragwanath J spoke of ‘the weight placed by law and society on the need for protection of
the human dignity of those who are not of an age to exercise personal autonomy and handle
the asperities of adult life . . . our legal history shows that children’s privacy rights are not
to be compared with those of adults’. Compare Murray v Express Newspapers Plc [2009] Ch
481; [2008] 3 WLR 1360; [2008] 2 Fam Law R 599; [2008] EWCA Civ 446.
45 Spelman v Express Newspapers [2012] EWHC 355 (QB) at [53]. See also AAA v Associated
Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 2103 (QB); [2013] EWCA Civ 554, and Weller v Associated
Newspapers Ltd [2014] All ER (D) 142 (Apr); [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB).
46 [2015] All ER (D) 194 (Nov); [2016] 3 All ER 357; [2016] 1 WLR 1541; [2015] EWCA Civ
1176.
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photographs of their children’s faces to be published. Because of these
developing exceptions, media business and economic interests have less
protection in relation to the activities of children and other vulnerable parties
which take place in public.
However, one aspect of the reasonable expectation element in privacy law
which favours media business and economic interests is the accepted view that
celebrities and public figure have less expectation of privacy than other
people.47 Reporting on the goings on of celebrities is big business for many
media entities. The expectation of privacy will be correspondingly reduced as
the person’s public profil increases. But the degree of that reduction of
expectation may differ according to whether the person has willingly put
himself or herself in the spotlight, or whether he or she is a ‘reluctant
debutante’ who has had publicity thrust on him or her.48 A number of UK cases
have taken the view that ‘if you have courted public attention then you have
less ground to object to the intrusion which follows’.49 Likewise, those with
important public roles which raise expectations of them as role models, may
expect more discussion of their conduct. Thus it was said of an England
football captain that there was a justifie public interest in reporting his
off-fiel behaviour and discussing his suitability for such an important role in
representing his country.50 A NZ court has found that the principal of a
high-profil school could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation
to an allegation that his past conduct was the subject of a police
investigation.51
Even the most well-known celebrity, however, is entitled to some degree of
privacy: everyone has the right to control publicity about intimate personal
matters which are no one’s business but their own.52 It is more difficult with
families of public figures The American authorities, cited in the judgments in
Hosking, suggest that even they have a lesser expectation of privacy than other
people: the glory reflecte from their parents cannot but affect their lives. In
fact, the behaviour of parents can unfortunately reduce a child’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in the sense that the child’s privacy can be ‘given
47 Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1; [2004] BCL 395; BC200460235 at [122].
48 ‘Reluctant debutante’ is the expression used by McGechan J in Tucker v News Media
Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716 at 735.
49 A v B Plc [2003] QB 195; [2002] 2 All ER 545; [2002] 3 WLR 542; [2002] EWCA Civ 337
at [11] per Lord Woolf CJ. See also Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 2 All ER 751; [1977] 1
WLR 760; Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] All ER (D) 182 (Feb); [2002] EMLR 22; [2002]
EWHC 137 (QB) and McClaren v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] EMLR 33; [2012]
EWHC 2466 (QB).
50 Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB). See also Trimingham v Associated
Newspapers Ltd [2012] 4 All ER 717; [2012] EWHC 1296 (QB) at [93] where Tugendhat
J said: ‘There is no dispute that the status of the claimant, that is whether the claimant is a
private individual . . . or a public figur . . . is also relevant when considering the right of
freedom of expression’. See also McClaren v News Group Newspapers Ltd, ibid.
51 Clague v APN News and Media Ltd [2013] NZAR 99; [2012] NZHC 2898.
52 A v B Plc [2003] QB 195; [2002] 2 All ER 545; [2002] 3 WLR 542; [2002] EWCA Civ 337
at [11] per Lord Woolf CJ, cited by Gault P and Blanchard J in Hosking [2005] 1 NZLR 1;
[2004] BCL 395; BC200460235 at [121]. The House of Lords expressly recognised this in
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457; 62 IPR 231; [2004] 2 All ER 995; [2004] UKHL
22. See also McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73; [2007] 3 WLR 194; [2007] EMLR 113; [2006]
EWCA Civ 1714 at [55] per Buxton LJ.
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away’. The child in AAA v Associated Newspapers Ltd53 was less than a year
old, and the claim was for misuse of private information arising from the
publication of articles and a photo over a period of some months speculating
about whether the paternity of the child was a well-known politician.
Publication of the articles was found not to be a misuse of private information.
The child did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, but this was
compromised and reduced by the behaviour of the mother because she had
been indiscreet, telling others at a house party about the paternity issues
although her claim stated she wanted to control when the child should fin out
about her paternity.
IV Recent development of remedial principles in
privacy law
A Damages
The Gulati v MGN Ltd case54 shocked media in the United Kingdom because
the court made a series of much higher damages awards than had ever been
made before against media. Damages awarded in this case ranged from
£72,500 to £260,280. Prior to this, the highest award of damages was £60,000
to Max Mosley in Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd.55 However, it is
important to note the awards made against Mirror Group Newspapers in
Gulati were for the worst sorts of privacy breaches which also involved
criminal activity. The case involved the determination of damages after the
Mirror finall admitted sustained and consistent phone hacking in particular,
over many years, used against celebrities, public figure and indeed, some
‘ordinary’ people. It shows that in the matter of determining what losses will
be compensated for in privacy cases, media have not been able to persuade the
courts to recognise their business and economic interests with great success.
In Gulati, the Mirror suggested that where privacy is breached, damages
should cover only distress and injury to feelings. But the numerous claimants
argued there should be compensation for loss of autonomy, for injury to
feelings and for damage to dignity. The judge, Mr Justice Mann, decided these
claims are indeed about more than distress and injury to feelings. He thought
that there is a right to privacy and damages should reflec the fact that the right
itself has been infringed and autonomy has been taken. He said:
While the law is used to awarding damages for injured feelings, there is no reason
in principle, in my view, why it should not also make an award to reflec
infringements of the right itself, if the situation warrants it.
Neither did the court accept that it is too difficult to measure what loss of
things like autonomy are worth. He went on to say:
The fact that the loss is not scientificall calculable is no more a bar to recovering
damages for ‘loss of personal autonomy’ or damage to standing than it is to damages
for distress. If one has lost ‘the right to control the dissemination of information
53 [2012] EWHC 2103 (QB); [2013] EWCA Civ 554.
54 [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch) (Gulati).
55 [2008] EWHC 687 (QB).
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about one’s private life’ then I fail to see why that, of itself, should not attract a
degree of compensation, in an appropriate case.56
When working out the amounts to be awarded for publication in each claim,
the judge bore in mind the circulation and readership figure of the
newspapers, which were substantial. In this calculation, media business and
economic interests could be said to have been used against them. For example,
daily circulation figure for the Daily Mirror were just over 2 million in 2003,
falling to 1.5 million in 2008. However, readership generally was accepted to
be much more than that — argued as 2.5 times that, making it over 4 million
in every year except 2008. Generally then, there was a considerable readership
for the articles in question, and all the articles were made available online.
Additionally, the court stated a number of principles impacting on how
media can protect their businesses:
• Certain types of information are likely to be more significan than
others. Medical information is more likely to be private, so its
interception and disclosure is likely to attract a higher figure This
will cover matters of mental health as well as physical health.
However, not all medical-related disclosures will be treated the same
— this will depend on the nature of the information.
• Significan private financia matters also attract a higher degree of
privacy, and therefore compensation.
• But information about a social meeting which is used to get a
photograph is likely to attract a lower degree of privacy in terms of
compensation, but can be magnifie by other factors, such as
contributing to a feeling of harassment.
• Information about matters internal to a relationship will be treated as
private. Compensation levels will depend on the nature of the
information listened to and disclosed, the amount of distress and
upset caused and the effect on the relationship. Information which
damages the relationship, or which is likely to impede attempts by
the couple to repair the relationship if that is what they are trying to
do, will likely be treated as a serious infringement and result in
substantial compensation.
• The Egg-shell skull rule applies. This means a thinner-skinned
individual may be caused more upset, and therefore receive more
compensation, than a thicker-skinned individual who is the subject of
the same intrusion.57
B Injunctions
PJS v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd,58 a recent prominent privacy case from the
United Kingdom deserves attention because in it, in spite of concerted media
resistance, the courts severely reduced legal protection for the publication of
kiss and tell stories, a significan source of media profit particularly for
tabloid media. In the case, an injunction was granted to the plaintiff by the
High Court to prevent the publication of the fact that he had been involved in
56 Gulati [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch) at [111].
57 Ibid, at [229].
58 [2016] EWCA Civ 393 (PJS).
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extramarital affairs, including a private tryst with two others. It was granted,
in particular, to protect the children of the couple from harassment by media
if the name was allowed to be disclosed. The initial injunction was lifted by
the Court of Appeal, but that decision was appealed to the Supreme Court,
which upheld the injunction in a powerful judgment even though the name of
the applicant had been leaked or sold into other jurisdictions, published by
media in the United States and Scotland and had also appeared on the internet.
First, the court made it very clear that so-called ‘kiss and tell’ stories are
very low-value speech — they are forms of commercial speech, since they are
really intended to sell more media output. Although it was emphasised media
have a right to report the behaviour of well-known figure in order to criticise
them, for there to be any public interest in kiss and tell stories, the stories must
contribute to a debate of general public interest in a democratic society,
otherwise the protection of the right to freedom of expression will count for
little. Kiss and tell stories have therefore been confirme as being at the
bottom end of the spectrum of importance in terms of speech and will weigh
little when balanced against privacy rights.
Second, the court rejected the view that injunctions are useless in privacy
law in the internet age. It said injunctions can still be of practical use to stop
a media storm breaking on the family, particularly the children, if disclosure
was allowed.59 The court also made a statement which could be seen as
strongly unsympathetic to media business and economic interests:
It is one thing for what should be private information to be unlawfully disseminated:
it is quite another for that information to be recorded in eye-catching headlines and
sensational terms in a national newspaper . . .
It is interesting to contemplate what the fallout from PJS will be. A narrow
interpretation of the decision would suggest the Supreme Court merely crafted
a special role for injunctions to play within privacy law — that of preventing
harassment which might flo from publication. I think it did more than that,
however, and a more broad interpretation is the right one. At the very least,
PJS made clear low-level speech will not weigh highly against privacy
interests or, alternatively, that the public interest in low level speech like kiss
and tell stories has to be very high to trump the privacy interest. However, it
can be argued something more fundamental than remedial change took place,
and that the case made clear that the UK privacy tort itself protects not only
against publication of information, but also against forms of harassment and
intrusion, which it has not clearly done in the past. This will impact directly
on the ability of media to engage in newsgathering. Finally, it is possible the
case and the behaviour of the media in relation to it will encourage more
applications for so-called super injunctions in the future because claimants
will be more motivated to seek orders which cannot be reported at all and will
be able to use evidence of the blatant attempts of media to undermine the PJS
privacy injunction to argue that a super injunction would be a good idea. In
this, then, media behaviour might be seen as having undermined its own
business and economic interests in the long run.
59 Ibid, at [64]–[65].
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V A serious harm threshold in defamation
The fina area I address which may provide possible protection for business
and economic interests of media in defamation and privacy is the development
of processes which allow the weeding out ‘undeserving claims’ as early as
possible in order to avoid the expense of long drawn out claims. All
jurisdictions have preliminary processes which allow forms of strike out, and
applications for security as to costs or to halt vexatious litigants. However, a
recent development in UK defamation law is of interest. Following a number
of court decisions,60 the UK Defamation Act 2013 now contains a
qualificatio or threshold of seriousness, so as to exclude trivial claims.61
Section 1 of the Act provides:
(1) A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to
cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant.
(2) For the purposes of this section harm to the reputation of a body that trades for
profi is not ‘serious harm’ unless it has caused or is likely to cause the body serious
financia loss.62
This provision will be of some value to media defendants depending on how
rigorously and efficiently it is applied. The firs decision applying the
provision clarifie that evidence will not be required in every case to satisfy
the serious harm test.63 This is because some statements are so obviously
likely to cause serious harm to a person’s reputation that an inference can
arise. The example given in the case was if a national newspaper with a large
circulation wrongly accuses someone of being a terrorist or a paedophile. The
court considered that in such a case the likelihood of serious harm to
reputation would be plain. Thus, the more serious the allegation made by
media, the easier it may be for a claimant to satisfy the requirement.
For less obvious allegations, claimants will be put to the expense of
obtaining evidence by commissioning material such as opinion poll surveys,
or producing comments from blogs, and may fin it harder to pass through the
threshold. However, depending on the evidence put forward, and the other
circumstances taken into account, it may in fact be possible for the threshold
to be satisfie even though a claimant in fact did well after the impugned
publication. An example is Theedom v Nourish Training,64 where serious
allegations were published by email to over 100 actual and potential
60 The leading case being Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946; [2005] 2
WLR 1614; [2005] EMLR 353; [2005] EWCA Civ 75 at [55].
61 It is interesting to note that UK courts also hold that trivial infringements are not within the
compass of privacy law: it has been said that the invasion must be ‘of some seriousness’: M
v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 2 AC 91; [2006] 4 All ER 929; [2006] 2
WLR 637; [2006] UKHL 11 at [83], cited in McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73; [2007] 3 WLR
194; [2007] EMLR 113; [2006] EWCA Civ 1714 at [12].
62 Section 1(2) is duplicated in New Zealand’s Defamation Act 1992 s 6, a requirement that has
existed in the law for many decades.
63 Cooke v MGN Ltd [2015] 2 All ER 622; [2015] 1 WLR 895; [2014] EWHC 2831 (QB);
Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2016] QB 402; [2016] 2 WLR 437; [2015] EWHC 2242
(QB) and Theedom v Nourish Training [2015] EWHC 3769 (QB); and Sobrinho v Impresa
Publishing SA [2016] EWHC 66 (QB). See also A Mullis and A Scott, ‘Tilting at Windmills:
The Defamation Act 2013’, (2014) 77 MLR 87 at 87–109.
64 Theedom v Nourish Training, ibid.
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customers of the defendant. The claimant provided some evidence of
responses to the emails, however the court found this did not add or detract
much from inferences which would normally be drawn from publications of
this kind. The emails had been sent by an influentia and apparently reliable
author to a fairly substantial audience that was potentially important to the
claimant’s career and no steps had been taken to withdraw or apologise for the
contents of the email. The serious harm requirement was met.
As regards the threshold requirement for business claimants to show serious
financia loss or likely serious financia loss, it appears the courts are using a
practical approach to whether this has been met. This means most business
claimants have to put forward evidence of some kind or other, although how
this is treated will, as with the requirement for individual claimants, be
crucial.65
The fina point to make is one about the risks associated with attempting to
shortcut potentially long proceedings by requiring a party to establish or meet
a new requirement. Such constraints inevitably create new issues over which
the parties will battle, thus adding to the complexity and cost rather than
simplifying processes. The UK threshold cases decided so far suggest that to
determine whether the requirements as to serious harm are met, the sorts of
things the courts will look at are the nature and seriousness of the words used,
how far and wide the publication has gone and to what sort of audience,
whether an apology has been published, whether a reliable source has been
used, and for online publication, how long the words have been online and
how many hits have resulted.66
Carrying out such a detailed assessment could result in mini-trials which
will make preliminary hearings more complex rather than less, and undermine
part of the purpose of the reform.67 A practical and fair approach should be
used to combat this.
VI Conclusion
This article has traversed a number of issues to test which facets of the
defamation and privacy torts might provide recognition and protection for
media business and economic interests. It is rare that these torts directly and
favourably address the fact that the media are commercial enterprises which,
although they perform a crucial function as the fourth estate of maintaining
and enhancing democratic states and the rights of citizens within them, would
cease to exist if they could not sell copy.
By examining the development of public interest defences within the torts,
65 Undre v London Borough of Harrow [2016] EWHC 931 (QB). In New Zealand, it does not
appear too difficult for a business to prove likely pecuniary loss under s 6 of the Defamation
Act 1992. See, eg, Mount Cook Group Ltd v Johnstone Motors Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 488 at
497; 19 IPR 482 at 491.
66 See Cooke v MGN Ltd [2015] 2 All ER 622; [2015] 1 WLR 895; [2014] EWHC 2831 (QB);
Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2016] QB 402; [2016] 2 WLR 437; [2015] EWHC 2242
(QB); Sobrinho v Impresa Publishing SA [2016] EWHC 66 (QB).
67 This is of some interest in New Zealand, where at least one court has approved the
UK requirement for a serious harm threshold for individual claims in recent obiter
statements: CPA Australia Ltd v New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants [2015]
NZHC 1854; BC201562452 at [171]–[182].
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it is apparent that the development and continued refinemen of these defences
have increased recognition for the business and economic interests of media
by creating more certainty about what stories can be published. However,
because most of these public interest defences allow or require the behaviour
of the publisher in obtaining and publishing the story to be examined by
courts, it is clear the defences should be applied broadly and courts should
attempt to avoid telling editors how to do their job.
In privacy law, the general rule that activities in public can be reported on
or photographed favours media business and economic interests. It is
important that the developing exceptions to this rule which mark the activities
of vulnerable people and children are carefully applied and delimited. Aspects
of the law which favour media in this respect are that celebrities and public
figure have less expectation of privacy than other people as may those who
are treated as role models, and that parents can in some cases be found to have
given away the privacy of their children.
Remedial developments in privacy law do not appear to favour media
business and economic interests, in that privacy awards have increased while
such awards have also been held to cover more than distress and injury to
feelings, and now clearly cover damage to dignity and autonomy as well.
Injunctions have been held to have valid functions in spite of the escape of
injuncted information onto the internet and applications for super-injunctions
may increase in the future. The death knell may have sounded for high-profi
kiss and tell stories. One possible business and economic advantage from
these developments may be, however, that otherwise uncertain areas of
remedial law have now been clarified making it easier for media to adjust
commercial behaviour and reduce risk.
Finally, in defamation law, the development of serious harm thresholds
suggests possible increased protection from the reduction of costs and time
spent by media defending undeserving actions. However, it remains unclear as
yet how effective such reforms will be.
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